

Vector Space Secret Sharing Scheme

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1. Security in cryptography is based on the secret key K .
2. In private-key cryptography, some time it is not secure to give secret key to an individual(participant).
3. Therefore secret sharing scheme was introduced to share secret key K among authorized group of participants.

Secret Sharing Scheme

Secret sharing scheme works as follows: Let $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n\}$ be set of all participants.

STEP 1: Determine authorized group

STEP 2: Secure and public information are given to all participants for secret key K .

STEP 3: When authorized group of participants pool their share, then they will recover the secret key K .

STEP 4: If one or more participants are missing from the group, then remaining members of the authorized group cannot determine the secret key K .

Example: Time magazine(May 4, 1992)

Russian nuclear ignition key

$\mathcal{P} = \{\text{Boris Yeltsin, Yevgeni Shaposhnikov, Defence Ministry}\}$

Authorized group $B \subset \mathcal{P}$ such that $|B| = 2$.

Basic Secret Sharing Schemes

Some of the well-known secret sharing schemes are:

- 1) The Shamir Threshold Scheme (also Blakley)
- 2) The Monotone Circuit Construction
- 3) Brickell Vector Space Construction

Brickel Vector Space Construction

Let $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n\}$ be set of participants and $\Gamma = \{B_1, B_2, \dots, B_k\}$ be an access structure on \mathcal{P} .

Let p be large enough prime number and $d \geq 2$ be an integer number.

Suppose there exist a function $\phi : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow (\mathbb{Z}_p)^d$ with the following property:

$$(1, 0, \dots, 0) \in \langle \phi(P_i) : P_i \in B \rangle \Leftrightarrow B \in \Gamma = \{B_1, \dots, B_k\}. \quad (1)$$

Algorithm I: Vector Space Sharing Scheme

(Due to Brickell)

Input: access structure Γ and ϕ function satisfying (1)

Initial Phase:

- 1) for $1 \leq i \leq n$
- 2) D gives public share $\phi(P_i) \in (\mathcal{Z}_p)^d$ to P_i

Share Computation:

- 3) D chooses secret key $K \in \mathcal{Z}_p$
- 4) D secretly chooses $a_2, a_3, \dots, a_d \in \mathcal{Z}_p$ and forms vector $\mathbf{a} = (K, a_2, a_3, \dots, a_d)$
- 5) for $i = 1$ to n
- 6) D computes $y_i = \mathbf{a} \cdot \phi(P_i)$
- 7) D gives secret share y_i to P_i

Brickel Vector Space Construction

Example: Let $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4\}$ be set of participants and $\Gamma = \{B_1, B_2\} = \{\{P_1, P_2, P_3\}, \{P_1, P_4\}\}$ be access structure. By trial and error we can find the following ϕ function, where $d = 3, p \geq 3$:

$$\phi(P_1) = (0, 1, 0)$$

$$\phi(P_2) = (1, 0, 1)$$

$$\phi(P_3) = (0, 1, -1)$$

$$\phi(P_4) = (1, 1, 0)$$

$$(1, 0, 0) = \phi(P_2) - \phi(P_1) + \phi(P_3), \text{ where } B_1 = \{P_1, P_2, P_3\} \in \Gamma$$

$$(1, 0, 0) = \phi(P_4) - \phi(P_1), \text{ where } B_2 = \{P_1, P_4\} \in \Gamma$$

No other subset of \mathcal{P} which does not contain B_1 or B_2 cannot create $(1, 0, 0)$

Brickel Vector Space Construction

We will represent ϕ as a matrix

$$\phi = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|} \hline 0 & 1 & 0 \\ \hline 1 & 0 & 1 \\ \hline 0 & 1 & -1 \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 0 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

Algorithm 1 is very efficient algorithm but requirement of existence of function ϕ is the only drawback

There is no known efficient algorithm to construct such function ϕ for any given access structure Γ

Stinson indicated in his book that trail and error (brute force search) is the only way to find it

For large parameters n, p, d exhaustive search is time consuming

ϕ Functions for Special Access Structures

Even if construction of such function ϕ is not very easy for every access structure

There is very elegant algorithm to construct a ϕ function for one particular access structure.

Let $G = (V, E)$ be a complete multipartite graph

Then define participant set $\mathcal{P} = V$ and access structure $\Gamma = E$

Construction of ϕ function for the vector space secret sharing is very easy (based on theorem in Stinson)

Example: Complete bipartite graph $G = (V, E)$

$V = \{P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, P_5\}$ and

$E = \{\{P_1, P_3\}, \{P_1, P_4\}, \{P_1, P_5\}, \{P_2, P_3\}, \{P_2, P_4\}, \{P_2, P_5\}\}$

$\mathcal{P} = V$, $\Gamma = E$, and $V(G) = V_1 \cup V_2 = \{P_1, P_2\} \cup \{P_3, P_4, P_5\}$.

Pick two $x_1 = 1, x_2 = 2$, of $(\mathcal{Z}_p)^2$, where $p \geq 2$ and function as follows:

$$\phi = \begin{array}{|c|c|} \hline x_1 & 1 \\ \hline x_1 & 1 \\ \hline x_2 & 1 \\ \hline x_2 & 1 \\ \hline x_2 & 1 \\ \hline \end{array} = \begin{array}{|c|c|} \hline 1 & 1 \\ \hline 1 & 1 \\ \hline 2 & 1 \\ \hline 2 & 1 \\ \hline 2 & 1 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

Algorithm II: Construction of ϕ for multipartite graph

Input: Complete multipartite graph $G = (\mathcal{P}, \Gamma)$

- 1) determine disjoint partitions of $V(G) = \cup_{i=1}^k V_i$
- 2) choose distinct $x_i \in \mathcal{Z}_p$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, k$, where $p \geq k$
- 3) for $j = 1$ to $|\mathcal{P}|$
- 4) if $P_j \in V_i$, for some i
- 5) define $\phi(P_j) = (x_i, 1)$
- 6) return ϕ

Special Access Structure I

Let $G = (V, E)$ a multipartite graph but not complete


$\mathcal{P} = V$ and $\Gamma = E$ such that

$\Gamma = \{B_1, B_2, \dots, B_m\}$ has the following properties:

- 1) $B_i \cap B_j = \emptyset$ for all $i \neq j$
- 2) $|B_i| = k$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, m$

Special Access Structure I

Example: $G = (V, E)$ with $V = \{1, 4\} \cup \{2, 5\} \cup \{3, 6\}$ and $E = \{(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3), (4, 5), (4, 6), (5, 6)\}$



$\mathcal{P} = V = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$ and $\Gamma = \{B_1, B_2\} = \{\{1, 2, 3\}, \{4, 5, 6\}\}$

$|B_i| = k = 3$ so $d = 2k - 1 = 6 - 1 = 5$, and let us take $p = 5$
 First construct A_1 and A_2 for $B_1 = \{1, 2, 3\}$ and $B_2 = \{4, 5, 6\}$,
 respectively

$$A_1 = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline 1 & 1 & 0 & 2 & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 2 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 2 \\ \hline \end{array} \quad A_2 = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline 1 & 1 & 0 & 3 & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 1 & 1 & 3 & 3 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 3 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

Then ϕ is

$$\phi = \begin{array}{|c|} \hline A_1 \\ \hline A_2 \\ \hline \end{array} = \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline 1 & 1 & 0 & 2 & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 2 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 2 \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 0 & 3 & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 1 & 1 & 3 & 3 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 3 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

Algorithm III: Construction of ϕ

Input: $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n\}$, $\Gamma = \{B_1, B_2, \dots, B_m\}$,
where $B_i \cap B_j = \emptyset$ for all $i \neq j$ and $|B_i| = k$

- 1) pick $x_i \in \mathcal{Z}_p$ such that $1 < x_1 < x_2 < \dots < x_m$
- 2) for $s = 1$ to m
- 3) construct $A_s = (a_{ij})_{k \times 2k-1}$ with all 0 entries
- 4) for $i = 1$ to k
- 5) $a_{ii} = 1$
- 6) for $i = 1$ to $k - 1$
- 7) $a_{i(i+1)} = 1$
- 8) for $i = 1$ to $k - 1$
- 9) $a_{i(k+i)} = x_s$
- 10) for $i = 2$ to k
- 11) $a_{i(k+i-1)} = x_s$

12) return $\phi =$

A_1
A_2
...
A_m

Matrix A_i constructed by **Algorithm III** will be like

1	2	3	4	..	k-1	k	k+1	k+2	k+3	..	2k-1
1	1	0	0	..	0	0	x_i	0	0	..	0
0	1	1	0	..	0	0	x_i	x_i	0	..	0
0	0	1	1	..	0	0	0	x_i	x_i	..	0
..
0	0	0	0	..	1	1	0	0	..	x_i	x_i
0	0	0	0	..	0	1	0	0	..	0	x_i

Properties of block A_j :

1. The first column has unique 1.
2. Columns 2 through k have exactly two 1's.
3. Columns $k + 1$ through $2k - 1$ have exactly two x_i 's.

Lemma

Let $B_j = \{P_{i_1}, P_{i_2}, \dots, P_{i_k}\}$ be an authorized set. Assume A_j is created by **Algorithm III** for B_j . Then $(1, 0, 0, \dots, 0)$ can be written as linear combination of shares, i.e. rows of A_j , of B_j but if one or more rows of A_j is missing, then $(1, 0, 0, \dots, 0)$ cannot be written as linear combination of remaining rows of A_j .

Proof.

Let a_j be j -th row of A_i . Then

$(1, 0, 0, \dots, 0) = (a_1 + a_3 + \dots) - (a_2 + a_4 + \dots)$ by properties of A_i

Now let $C = \{P_{i_{j_1}}, P_{i_{j_2}}, \dots, P_{i_{j_l}}\} \subset B_i$. Without loss of generality we can assume that $i_{j_1} < i_{j_2} < \dots < i_{j_l}$.

If $i_{j_i} \neq 1$, then it is obvious that $(1, 0, 0, \dots, 0)$ cannot be linear combination of these rows. Hence $P_{i_{j_1}} = P_1$.

Since C is unauthorized, there is at least one participant $P_{i_{j_s}}$ which is not in C . Let s be the smallest index such that $P_{i_{j_s}} \notin C$

Let $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_l \in \mathbb{Z}_p$

Suppose:

$(1, 0, 0, \dots, 0) = a_1(1, 1, \dots, x_i, 0, \dots, 0) + \sum_{r=2}^l a_r \phi(P_{i_{j_r}}) \Leftrightarrow$
 $a_1 = 1, a_1 + a_2 = 0, \dots, a_{s-2} + a_{s-1} = 0, a_{s-1} = 0, \dots$ where $s \geq 2$.

Since $a_1 = 1$, then $a_2 = -1$ (in \mathbb{Z}_p) so on, hence we get $a_{s-1} = 1$ (or -1 based on even or odd s value) contradiction with $a_{s-1} = 0$. □

Theorem

Let $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n\}$ be set of participants. Access structure $\Gamma = \{B_1, B_2, \dots, B_m\}$ is given where $B_i \cap B_j = \emptyset$ for all $i \neq j$ and $|B_i| = k$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, m$. Then the function ϕ , which is constructed by **Algorithm III**, satisfies **(1)**.

Proof.

Let $C = \{P_{j_1}, P_{j_2}, \dots, P_{j_l}\} \subset \mathcal{P}$. If C is an authorized set, then $B_i \subset C$ for some i . Hence by previous lemma we are done.

If C is not authorized set, then we have the following cases:

Case 1: If $|C| = l < k$

Case 2: If $|C| = l = k$

Case 3: If $|C| = l > k$

